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SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
James P. Piscatori* 
The Middle East, broadly defined, is 
penetrated by five bodies of water, the 
five "fingers" of the Mediterranean, 
Black, Caspian, and Red Seas, and the 
Persian Gulf. The Red Sea and Gulf 
have received particular attention in 
recent history. The significance of the 
Red Sea stems, first of all, \ from its 
connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Israel has one non-Mediterranean port, 
Eilat, which can only be reached 
through the Red Sea and then through 
the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Denial of entry to 
Israel through closure of the Straits of 
Tiran was considered a casus belli in 
1967, and in 1973 a blockade of the 
entire sea was carried out at the Bab 
al-Mandab Strait to support the war 
aims of the Arab front. Some strategists 
believe that in a long war similar action 
could offset the Israeli advantage in 
holding Sharm al-Shaykh.l Second, the 
Red Sea is important as the gateway to 
the Suez Canal, which itself was eco-
nomically and strategically significant 
prior to 1967, because it reduces by 
one-half the Gulf to London journey. 
The recently reopened canal probably 
will be highly significant again as it is 
widened and deepened to accommodate 
ships of the 150,OOO-ton range and 
eventually of the 270,OOO-ton range? 
Finally, the Soviet base at Berbera in 
Somalia highlights the vulnerability of 
access to the sea itself. 
Of far greater importance is the 
Persian Gulf. Indeed, the growing indus-
trial dependence on oil, even more than 
the discovery and exploitation of the 
*1 wish to acknowledge with gratitude the 
assistance of Professors K. Booth of the 
University College of Wales and R.K. Rama-
zani of the University of Virginia. 
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resource itself, has helped to move the 
Gulf to the economic, strategic, and 
political forefront of world politics. The 
oil imported by the United States from 
the Middle East as a whole, for example, 
constituted 15-17 percent of total 
American oil imports during the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war. American imports 
from the region then were 877,000 
barrels per day and during the first 6 
months of 1976 the figures rose to 
2,124,000 barrels per day.3 Though the 
increase is substantial, American oil 
imports from the Middle East do not 
yet rival the present 80 percent level of 
oil imports for Western Europe. This 
Middle Eastern connection is not sur-
prising since the area as a whole con-
tributes about half the total oil produc-
tion in the world, with Persian Gulf 
countries in particular producing one-
third of the total.4 
Given the sudden changes in the 
price of oil fixed by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
the revenues that are accruing to these 
states have no less suddenly increased. 
Iran is spending about $69 billion and 
Saudi Arabia approximately $140 bil-
lion in their current Five Year Plans to 
develop infrastructures and to provide 
new social services. Iraq is budgeting 
over $3 billion per year for investment 
and development purposes. These 
ambitious plans have stimulated a flurry 
of activity by European and American 
businesses competing to provide the 
technical services and sophisticated 
equipment required. The wealth in the 
Gulf is also being used to build up 
national armories. In 1974 alone, Per-
sian Gulf countries purchased over $4 
billion worth of arms from the United 
States, $1 billion from France, $500 
million from Great Britain, and $340 
million from the Soviet Union.5 The 
trend is accelerating,6 and it is already 
clear that military sales in the Gulf, like 
commercial sales and services there, 
constitute big business. Gulf countries, 
in short, are amassing great fortunes 
which also are converted into profits for 
the oil-consuming and technologically 
advanced countries. 
This economic interdependence has 
added to the strategic importance at-
tached to the Persian Gulf area since the 
British withdrew in 1971. The Soviet 
presence in the upper Gulf, symbolized 
by the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation and 
Friendship with Iraq,7 has been of 
concern to Western strategists. There is 
some evidence that Soviet influence was 
waning in Iraq,8 but recently there has 
been a strengthening of ties.9 In light of 
the lingering Soviet presence, regional 
cooperation to exclude all external 
powers is the American goal in the Gulf. 
Several factors overlap to account for 
the position of the United States: fear 
not only of a forcible interruption of 
the oil flow through the Strait of 
Hormuz but also of Soviet-inspired revo-
lution against the traditional, pro-
Western, regimes; knowledge that the 
American presence itself is limited to 
one command ship and two surface 
combatants, forming the Middle East 
Force at Bahrain;1o and sensitivity to 
the potential spillover effect naval com-
petition in the Indian Ocean could have 
because of its geographical proximity. 
In light of this reliance on friendly, 
regional policemen-mainly Iran11 but 
also Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent, 
American arms sales to the Gulf are seen 
as valuable in more than the economic 
sense. 
It is against this background of inter-
secting interests-economic, political, 
and strategic-that law of the sea issues 
in the Persian Gulf and the positions of 
Gulf States on those issues assume 
importance. Maritime disputes affect 
regional stability, and, moreover, several 
of the littoral states wield such eco-
nomic and potential military might that 
their views may influence the direction 
of the developing law. Saudi Arabia, at 
first glance, would seem unlikely to 
have any impact on the law of the sea. 
The predominantly desert character of 
its landmass, the world's 13th largest, 
has given greater historical significance 
to the nomadic Badu than to dhow-
equipped sailors. And the Saudi Navy is 
small, though growing: 1,500 personnel, 
about 2,000 officers and men in training 
at the San Diego Naval Training Center, 
two naval bases, three fast patrol boats 
(FPB), one patrol boat, and several 
landing craft and mine counter measures 
(MCM) on order. 1 2 
There are, however, three reasons 
why the Saudi position deserves atten-
tion. First, Saudi Arabia's stature in 
world politics has dramatically in-
creased. With one-quarter of the world's 
producible oil reserves, the Kingdom 
possesses twice the reserves of the West-
ern Hemisphere and twice those of the 
Soviet Union. 1 3 In addition, Saudi 
Arabia, providing 25 percent of Ameri-
can oil imports today as compared to 10 
percent before the 1973 war, represents 
the principal Middle Eastern supplier of 
oil to the United States. The wealth of 
natural resources has been translated 
into political influence as the West 
generally and the United States particu-
larly have realized that their economic 
well-being is in large measure due to the 
goodwill of the Saudis. This wealth has 
also allowed Saudi Arabia to exert 
considerable impact on Arab states, 
especially on Egypt which seems in-
cessantly in search of a financial backer. 
That the Saudis themselves are aware 
that their political role has expanded is 
seen by the recent rapprochement with 
Iraq and the People's Democratic Re-
public of Yemen, both of which have 
long been hostile to the "conservative" 
Saudi monarchy. International law and 
politics are intertwined, and if for no 
other reason, Saudi Arabia's position on 
the law of the sea should be examined 
because the Kingdom itself is poten-
tially on the level of world politics a 
major power, and actually within the 
Middle Eastern subsystem, a great 
power. 
Secondly, the Persian Gulf has been 
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the scene of disputes over the delimita-
tion of offshore boundaries, several of 
which have involved Saudi Arabia. Dis-
agreements persist between Iran and 
Iraq, and Iran and the United Arab' 
Emirates. Additionally, there are 
boundary and territorial differences be-
tween Iraq and Kuwait, over Bubiyan 
and aI-Warba islands, and between Qatar 
and Bahrain, particularly over the status 
of the Howar Islands.14 Saudi Arabia 
represents a Gulf state that has directly 
negotiated agreements with its neigh-
bors, Bahrain and Iran, and that is 
presently dealing with Qatar and Kuwait 
in regard to outstanding problems. 
Finally, Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its 
location, is able to exert .some control 
over another important maritime area-
the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Although Saudi 
Arabia is not a "confrontation" state in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, its legal stance 
on this question of passage through 
straits has contributed to the general 
hostility and complicated the search for 
a modus vivendi. 
Law of the Sea Positions. Saudi 
Arabia prides itself on its Islamic herit-
age and its policy is often shaped 
around principles of the faith. While the 
daring exploits of Arab sailors are 
historically well-known, the sea, how-
ever, has been a comparatively less 
important consideration to the largely 
land-based Arab Muslims. The Qur'an 
itself displays an ambivalence on the 
subject with one passage indicating that 
men should be thankful for the liveli-
hood, food, and riches the waters yield 
(XVI:14) and another suggesting that 
the devil inhabits the sea (XVIII:62). 
The Prophet Muhammad had little to 
add save perhaps that Muslims who die 
in a seaborne jihad will be doubly 
rewarded in the afterlife. The rules of 
naval warfare were developed through 
qiyas or analogy and hardly differ from 
those of land conflict. They incorporate 
certain moderate principles: an enemy 
ship in distress is to be issued an aman 
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or safe passage into coastal waters, and 
in keeping with general practice, vessels 
bearing diplomatic envoys are thought 
to possess a special status.15 It is clear 
that the Shan 'a or basic law does not 
address itself to the controversial law of 
the sea issues of the 20th century. 
Lacking traditional guidance, therefore, 
Saudi Arabia has generally adopted a 
course not far different from that which 
is outlined in the international conven-
tions. 
Breadth of Territorial Sea. From the 
earliest days of the country, concern 
with the waters closest to the coast has 
been pragmatic in nature as evidenced 
by the fact that the first references are 
found in the fishing and Coast Guard 
regulations. The fishing rules defined 
the "coastal waters" of the then King-
dom of the Hijaz, Najd, and Dependen-
cies as the area within 4 miles of the 
coasts not including gulfs and inlets.1 6 
The Regulations for the Coast Guard 
Directorate and its Divisions were pri-
marily concerned with the "customs 
line" that was identical with the outer 
limit of Coast Guard control and that 
extended to 4 miles off the shore and 
10 miles within. This limit was not 
equivalent to the breadth of the terri-
torial sea because of Article 49 (b) 
which allowed the sea patrol in the 
performance of its duties to "go beyond 
the customs line within the boundaries 
of the Saudi Arab Kingdom when pur-
suing boats and smugglers.,,17 The 
outer boundaries were unspecified, but 
the assumption can be made, on the 
basis of the permission to go beyond the 
customs line, that territorial jurisdiction 
was seen as extending beyond the 4-IrJ1e 
zone mentioned in both the fishing and 
Coast Guard regulations. 
The Saudi government reminded its 
neighbors in 1933 that no precise sea 
boundaries had been agreed upon and 
that no rule of international law existed 
to facilitate the delimitation of terri-
torial waters.18 It was not until Royal 
Decree 6/4/5/3711 of 2 Sha'ban 1368 
(28 May 1949) that the term "territorial 
waters" was employed and precisely 
defined. These waters encompassed the 
inland waters of bays, shoals, and those 
between island and the mainland and 
between islands themselves, in addition 
to the "coastal sea" which extended 
outside the inland waters to a distance 
of 6 miles. This definition departed 
from the text of the original fishing 
rules in that it applied to all coasts of 
the Kingdom unified under the Saudi 
title in 1932-the Red Sea, Gulf of 
'Aqaba, and Persian GUlf.19 In relying 
on a 6-mile limit, Saudi Arabia chose to 
follow the earlier examples of the Otto-
man Empire, Syria, and Iran.2o Saudi 
Arabia however, led the way when it 
changed the relevant terminology to 
"territorial sea" and extended its 
boundaries to 12 nautical miles in a 
1958 royal decree.2 1 The effect was 
immediate as the two other major 
powers in the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, soon 
thereafter extended their limits to 12 
miles. 
In the explicit designation of terri-
torial waters and seas, the two decrees, 
particularly the second, went far toward 
bringing Saudi Arabia into the main-
stream of the international law of the 
sea. In contrast to early regulations, the 
1949 proclamation of King 'Abd 
al-' Azlz expressly declared that Saudi 
sovereignty extends to the territorial 
waters, the air above, and the soil and 
subsoil below. Another and significant 
indicator of Saudi Arabia's growing 
sophistication was the general invoca-
tion of international law and the spe-
cific reference to the principle of inno-
cent passage as the sole limitation on its 
sovereignty in the 1949 decree. The 
1958 decree was more general in its 
provision that Saudi sovereignty is 
limited by existing rules of international 
law (Article 2). Herbert Liebesny's con-
clusion, though specifically directed to 
the 1949 decree, is also relevant to the 
later proclamation: "The Saudi decree 
on territorial waters is a very carefully 
drawn document which is more detailed 
than many similar decrees and embodies 
modern theories of international law on 
the subject.,,22 The comment would be 
of no interest were it not for the fact 
that Saudi Arabia often is accused of a 
medieval mentality. 
The 1958 decree in particular was 
designed to put Saudi Arabia on an 
equal footing with other states at the 
first Law of the Sea Conference. The 
Saudi delegation chairman, Ahmad 
al-Shuqayn, Minister of State for United 
Nations Affairs, specifically pointed out 
that Saudi Arabia's change of words to 
"territorial sea" put it in line with the 
draft convention and was made to avoid 
the misleading impression that terri-
torial waters are limited only to inland 
waters. The delegate also took an un-
compromising stand on what has be-
come the standard Saudi commitment 
to a 12-mile territorial sea. Al-Shuqaycl, 
particularly critical of the United King-
dom's defense of the 3-mile limit, 
argued that the political and economic 
demands of the present age require a 
wider belt. He denied, moreover, that 
the 3-mile limit was never uniformly 
accepted and pointed to a number of 
Western scholars in support of his posi-
tion that states have determined their 
boundaries for a variety of reasons apart 
from the 3·mile example. 
Saudi Arabia thus suggested that 
states be allowed to set their own limits 
within a 12-mile maximum in order to 
provide some flexibility in the para-
meters sanctioned by (1) security needs, 
(2) new economic and technical devel-
opments, (3) state practice, and (4) a 
new legal consensus. In this sense, 
al-Shuqayn made the point that the 
debate is political and economic as well 
as juridical, yet he was not so attuned to 
the politicization of the debate that he 
could accept U.S. Representative Dean's 
speculation that the price of trans-
porting Saudi oil would increase as the 
territorial sea widens.2 3 
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There was strong Saudi opposition to 
the American proposal for a 6-mile 
breadth. Al-Shuqayn, invoking the In-
ternational Law Commission's opinion 
that the territorial sea may be legiti-
mately extended to 12 miles, pledged 
that his country would not become a 
party to a convention that adopted the 
American draft. Ironically for so anti-
Communist a state as Saudi Arabia, its 
position echoed that of the Soviet bloc. 
Saudi Arabia specifically joined forces 
with Burma, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Morocco, the United Arab 
Republic, and Venezuela in sponsoring a 
draft calling for a territorial sea of 12 
miles with a contiguous fishing zone of 
an extra 12 miles. None of the proposals 
gained the necessary two-thirds ma-
jority,24 and Saudi Arabia did not 
become a party to the 1958 Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, nor to any of the other conven-
tions for that matter. 
By the 1960 conference, the Saudi 
position seems to have hardened on the 
importance of the territorial sea ques-
tion. The success of the regime of the 
sea by then was predicated on the 
resolution of this one issue. As a result, 
al-Shuqayri advanced the central thesis 
that the law of the sea is indivisible-
either there is a complete law with the 
territorial sea settled or there is no law 
at all. In almost sacrilegious rhetoric for 
a Saudi, he intoned this warning: "With-
out an acceptable formula for the deter-
mination of the territorial sea, these 
conventions of ours will remain outside 
the sacred temple of international 
laW."25 
The Kingdom was persistent in advo-
cating the 12-mile rule, and it is interest-
ing to note that the manner of argument 
was entirely a-Islamic. Al-Shuqayrl 
based his presentation on an appeal, 
inter alia, to state interests, the position 
of the polyculturally legitimate Interna-
tional Law Commission, Moore's Digest 
of International Law, the British High 
Court of Justice, and nowhere was Islam 
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invoked. Despite the Western-based 
rationale, Saudi Arabia clearly felt, at 
that time, that its identity should be 
tied to the Third World, which was 
believed to be rising up to reject the 
colonial legacy and to assert the 
equality and sovereignty of every state. 
The anti-imperialist sentiment is some-
what surprising for a state that escaped 
colonial masters: "We have emancipated 
our land, and the time has come to 
emancipate our sea."2 6 
If Saudi Arabia was then aligned 
against the major Western states and 
with the developing ones, by the Third 
Law of the Sea Conference it has found 
that it is aligned with the vast majority 
of states. The change, however, is not 
due to a position shift by the Saudis; to 
the contrary, they have remained con-
sistent in advocating a 12-mile territorial 
sea while an international consensus has 
solidified around the figure. Saudi 
Arabia, along with Arab League states, 
has not objected to the demands of the 
archipelagic states with regard to the 
territorial sea, provided that lanes of 
international navigation are kept open. 
Saudi Arabia has also joined the ma-
jority of states in the present nego-
tiations in advocating a 200-mile eco-
nomic zone beyond the territorial 
sea,27 but its commitment must be 
viewed as more a matter of principle 
than active concern when it is realized 
that the Persian Gulf at a maximum is 
160 miles in width and that the Red Sea 
has a maximum width of 190 miles. 
What is important for Saudi Arabia is 
the more limited area of the contiguous 
zone beyond the territorial sea, al-
though, as will be mentioned later, the 
country has seemingly endorsed the 
merging of the contiguous and eco-
nomic zone concepts. Currently, the 
Kingdom is the only state in the Persian 
Gulf that has explicitly claimed the 
right of surveillance over an adjacent 
6-mile zone in order to protect laws 
concerned with navigation, security, fi-
nance, and sanitation.2 8 
Saudi Arabia has been the leader in 
the Gulf in establishing the 12-mile rule, 
and it has also been one of the leaders in 
advocating the universal adoption of the 
rule. In the region, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, 
and Oman have followed the Saudi lead, 
but Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates have yet to follow suit. It is 
not likely that there will be any regional 
disputes since, as Richard Young points 
out, the 12-mile approach seems 
destined to be the Persian Gulf norm.2 9 
It is possible that there will be some 
tension over the contiguous zone, but to 
date this matter has not emerged as a 
significant issue. What is significant is 
that Saudi Arabia's consistent position 
undoubtedly influenced the positions of 
other littoral states in the Gulf and 
contributed to the emergence of the 
general consensus. 
Offshore Boundary Disputes. As 
early as 1949, the Saudis also showed 
that they were capable of keeping pace 
with new international law of the sea 
developments. The Truman Proclama-
tion of 1945 on the continental shelf 
inspired the 1949 royal decree on the 
submarine areas contiguous to Saudi 
Arabia's Persian Gulf coasts. Despite the 
fact that a continental shelf does not 
exist in the geological sense in the Gulf, 
the Saudi government, mindful of the 
natural bounty below the waters off its 
shores, wished to control its conserva-
tion and development in line with the 
unilateral declarations of states that 
could precisely lay claim to a continen-
tal shelf. The Kingdom claims that it 
should exercise control over the sub-
marine areas contiguous to its zone 
because (1) the natural resources, in the 
first place, are capable of being ex-
ploited by modern technology; (2) the 
state can act in the interests of proper 
usage and conservation of the resources; 
(3) the resources can only be effectively 
developed and conserved, at any rate, 
with state involvement and help; (4) 
activities off Saudi Arabia's coasts 
naturally involve its security; and (5) 
"various other nations" have already 
done SO.30 
The Saudi decree echoes the Presi-
dential proclamation, except in the im-
portant respect that jurisdiction and 
control are asserted over the subsoil and 
seabed itself, as Pakistan and Great 
Britain have also asserted, and not 
merely over the natural resources as in 
the American document. In contrast to 
the Kuwaiti constitutive reference to 
the region's "becoming" a part of the 
state, the Saudi wording like the Ameri-
can is declarative of an inherent right of 
jurisdiction.3 1 In addition, the Saudi 
decree follows American and British 
practice, and rejects Latin American 
claims of extensive control, by asserting 
that the waters above the contiguous 
seabed and soil are not subject to 
national interference. It should be 
noted, parenthetically, that Saudi 
Arabia has relied, in the absence of a 
proper shelf, on the idea of contiguity. 
This concept, however, is equivalent to 
the idea of the submerged mass next to 
a state's shores, and it should not be 
confused with the contiguous zone itself 
over which activities are regulated. Al-
though relying on contiguity, Saudi 
Arabia has not defined its extent. 
Rather, like the American proclamation 
on the continental shelf, the Saudi 
decree provides for negotiations with 
neighboring states in accordance with 
"equitable principles" in order to deter-
mine the precise boundaries of the 
contiguous "shelf." 
The call to negotiation was taken up 
in 1958 when an agreement was reached 
between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on 
the delimitation of the "underwater 
areas belonging to both countries." It 
might be noted that the actual delimita-
tion between the two states is de-
pendent not on "equitable principles" 
per se, but on principles agreed upon by 
the participant governments. Vice Presi-
dent Kuretsky of the International 
Court of Justice in the North Sea 
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Continental Shelf Case pointed out that 
Saudi Arabia allowed for this qualifica-
tion in the 1949 proclamation, yet there 
is resort to a standard concept in the 
Bahraini-Saudi case.32 The first clause 
of the bilateral agreement indicates that 
the division is to be based on the 
median line, a principle of equidistance 
that at least one student of Islamic law, 
Muhammad Hamidullah, finds enshrined 
in the classical sources as a valid means 
of settling boundaries.3 3 It is also a 
principle incorporated in Article 6 of 
the Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf. 
The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement 
deviates from strictly equal sharing in 
the second clause in which a special area 
is set aside for Saudi oil exploitation "in 
accordance with the wish of H.H. the 
Ruler of Bahrain." This grant may well 
reflect an appreciation by the Bahraini 
government of greater Saudi experience 
in the oilfield, since Bahrain is to receive 
half of the revenues from the area. Yet 
Saudi administrative control and sover-
eignty are specifically emphasized-an 
indicator, perhaps, that fraternal Islamic 
relations are not always stronger than 
national interests. The agreement is 
notable as the first Persian Gulf effort 
to settle conflicting claims over the 
subsurface of what is termed the "re-
gional waters." 
A second, more important effort to 
resolve Gulf differences is the Saudi-
Iranian agreement of 1968 in which the 
disputed islands of al-' Arabiyya and 
FarsI were apportioned to Saudi Arabia 
and Iran respectively. Consistent with 
both states' practice since 1958, each 
island is given a 12-mile territorial sea. 
The principle of equidistance was em-
ployed to demarcate the boundary 
between the overlapping territorial seas 
of the islands, and the agreement also 
delineated the boundaries of the subma-
rine areas appertaining to both countries 
in which ~ach has sovereign rights over 
the seabed and subsoil.34 Without going 
into great detail, we may say that the 
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agreement as a whole has gone far 
towards eliminating tension in the stra-
tegic waterway between its two most 
important littoral states. 
Another Gulf dispute remains largely 
unresolved, though its conflict potential 
is slight. It involves the status of the 
Neutral Zone lying between Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait that was delimited in 
the Uqair Convention of 1922. Al-
though the agreement is silent on the 
extent and position of maritime boun-
daries and though no bilateral arrange-
ments existed until 1965, it is clear that 
Saudi Arabia has for all practical pur-
poses held that at least a portion of the 
sea off the Neutral Zone belongs to it. 
However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
agreed, on 7 July 1965, to demarcate 
the overlapping jurisdictions off the 
Neutral Zone. The crucial Article VII, 
whose language itself is curious and 
reflective of the divergent regimes of the 
sea, provides that the two countries 
have the same rights over those portions 
of the territorial sea adjoining their 
sectors of the Neutral Zone and that a 
precise boundary is to be determined at 
a later time.3S The major, still un-
resolved, obstacle to agreement is due to 
the fact that Saudi Arabia has decreed a 
12-mile territorial sea whereas Kuwait 
has chosen to leave the breadth of its 
sea unspecified. 
There is a compromise agreement in 
the second paragraph of Article VII 
which refers to a 6-mile zone for the 
purpose of natural resource exploita-
tion. Its specific reference is to the 
seabed and subsoil next to the zone 
which is to be annexed to the land 
portion of the zone. Two points are 
notable: (1) The article makes a clear 
distinction between the waters and re-
sources of the zone-the limits of the 
former are unspecified whereas those of 
the latter are indicated. This distinction 
is a clear deviation from the Saudi 
position -in the 1949 and 1958 terri-
torial waters decrees and is thus an 
indicator of both the special position of 
the zone and the differences out-
standing with Kuwait. (2) The article 
makes a distinction between territorial 
waters over which each country can 
exercise rights consistent with its por-
tion of the zone and an undivided 
natural resource area that is attached to 
the zone as a whole. Once again, the 
extraordinary status of the zone is seen 
with its ambiguous if not confused 
division of rights alternately on a na-
tional and joint basis. 
The 1965 agreement, differing from 
the regular Saudi decrees which are 
declarative of existing rights, is clearly 
constitutive of a new maritime regime 
off the Neutral Zone. The difference is 
understandable given the unsettled 
character of this zone. Indeed, the case 
represents an extraordinary concession 
by Saudi Arabia that its sovereignty is 
limited; the bitter pill, however, is made 
sweeter by the fact that Kuwait's sover-
eignty is also restricted, despite the 
energetic denials of that country's legal 
adviser.36 To date, the boundary be-
tween the territorial seas has not been 
settled nor has the ancillary dispute 
concerning sovereignty over Qaru and 
Umm al-Maradim Islands been resolved. 
One somewhat related development 
should be noted. In a 1968 royal decree, 
the Saudi government asserted its claim 
to the hydrocarbon resources of the 
Red Sea. The pronouncement is odd in 
that it applies to a zone which lies 
adjacent to the continental shelf; it is 
not clear what the zone exactly en-
tails.37 There is no precedent in terms 
of a similar claim in the Persian Gulf, 
nor, it should be noted, can the pro-
posed area in the Red Sea be clearly 
delimited until the continental shelf 
itself of that sea is delineated, or even 
claimed. Arguing negatively, we may 
conclude that the zone was not meant 
to be identified with the contiguous 
zone since the decree does not assert 
control over security, immigration, and 
sanitation matters there; furthermore, 
the idea of the proposed zone cannot be 
equated with either the "hovering," 
customs zone or pollution control zone 
concepts since the decree does not 
mention the governable activities sub-
sumed under those categories.3 8 The 
primary Saudi concern in the 1968 
decree is ownership and exclusive ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of 
the seabed, and in this regard, the new, 
evolving economic zone may be rele-
vant. 
This concept, it would be well to 
note, has been controversial even within 
the bloc of developing states, the Group 
of 77.39 Disagreement has centered on 
the extent of the zone, but there has 
been broad agreement on the character 
of the zone. For example, two declara-
tions of the Organization of African 
Unity and two endorsements by the 
League of Arab States, both in 1973 
and 1974, assert that coastal states have 
sovereign rights over the mineral as well 
as biological resources of this zone. The 
Egyptian delegate to the Third Law of 
the Sea Conference concluded in 1974 
from these declarations that the conti-
nental shelf is included in this new 
category,40 and in this sense perhaps 
Saudi Arabia, by its 1968 decree, helped 
to advance the thought that it is per-
missible to claim resources in the conti-
nental shelf and the seabed beyond. The 
claim is still curious since the Saudi 
Kingdom has not clarified its under-
standing of the economic concept other 
than to join with other Arab states, 
Iran, Honduras, Mexico, India, and 
Liberia to suggest, in effect, that the 
contiguous and economic zones are 
largely synonymous.41 
Until there is further clarification, 
the decree may be considered, in the 
manner of the British Institute of Inter-
national and Comparative Law,42 as 
dealing with continental shelf-type 
matters. While there is no clause allow-
ing for negotiation on the basis of 
equitable principles in case of dispute 
with neighboring states, there is a sug-
gestion that joint exploration and 
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exploitation of the resources are pos-
sible in a "common zone" when recog-
nized by the Saudi government. The 
assumption that common zones are 
determined by negotiation is reasonable. 
No disputes appear likely since no major 
exploitation of valuable resources is 
underway, but it is a measure of Saudi 
Arabia's interest in the potential oil, 
heavy metal, and gypsum resources of 
the sea that it has made its claim known 
in advance of possible trouble. 
Passage Through Straits. Having ten-
tatively recognized the right of innocent 
passage as early as the fishing regula-
tions of 1932, Saudi Arabia strongly 
objected to the particular right of 
passage through straits as described in 
Article 16 (4) of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
The article reads: "There shall be no 
suspension of the innocent passage of 
foreign ships through straits which are 
used for international navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas and 
another part of the high seas of the 
territorial sea of a foreign State.,,43 The 
basic Saudi position, as developed at the 
United Nations conferences on the law 
of the sea, is that innocent passage is a 
right of way that is fully subject to law. 
That is, the Kingdom argued that an 
aggressor has no right of way in law 
generally at the expense of his victims, 
and that those states deemed in viola-
tion of international law and the United 
Nations Charter have no right of inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea 
of states they have injured. In short, 
aggression suspends the right of inno-
cent passage.44 It is clear that Israel is 
considered the case in point. 
In the course of specific delibera-
tions, Saudi Arabia wished to amend the 
American draft definition of innocent 
passage with the proviso that passage is 
not innocent when contrary "to the 
present rules or to other rules of inter-
national law." The Saudi delegate, 
al-Shuqayn, also wondered why another 
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proposal, which was eventually adopted 
by close vote, deleted the International 
Law Commission's condition that states 
are to respect the right of innocent 
passage through straits normally used 
for international traffic and why it 
extended the range to straits connecting 
the high seas to a territorial sea. When 
Article 16 as a whole was adopted by a 
wide margin in a 1958 plenary session, 
Saudi Arabia abstained because it be-
lieved that subparagraph 4 is designed to 
satisfy a unique case and is a "mutila-
tion" of international law. Al-Shuqayn 
ominously concluded: "Saudi Arabia 
would take the necessary steps to pro-
tect its national interests against the 
interpretation and application of para-
graph 4.,,45 
For the most part, Saudi Arabia 
relied on the philosophical position that 
the maritime laws of war are different, 
and it even went so far as to propose a 
subtitle indicating that the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea applies only in 
peacetime. Once again, its defense was 
based predominantly on western sources 
that have distinguished between the two 
states of war and peace: the Corfu 
Channel Case, the 1926 draft conven-
tion of the International Law Associa-
tion, and the law of the sea draft treaty 
of the International Law Commis-
sion.46 The Saudis, in effect, advanced 
the position of the realists in the study 
of international politics and law that, 
since the persistent reality of conflict is 
obvious, it would behoove the interna-
tional community to develop specific 
regulations to handle and to limit 
violence rather than to try vainly to 
abolish it. 
Despite the rationale, Saudi Arabia's 
opposition to innocent passage through 
straits is clearly designed to cover Israeli 
access to the strategic Straits of Tiran. 
This opposition, it should be noted, 
does not relate to the Strait of Hormuz, 
since the interconnected waters there 
are parts of the high seas through which 
unimpeded innocent passage is con-
sidered unquestionable. Al-Shuqayn was 
explicit at least once in his reference to 
the Straits of Tiran, when he argued 
that under the Palestine Armistice 
Agreements, Israel was given no juridical 
standing in the Gulf of 'Aqaba which is 
under Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian 
sovereignty.47 Saudi Arabia was united 
with all the Arab states, save one, in 
arguing the line and in accordingly 
refusing to sign the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea, and even with Tunisia 
that did sign but expressly declined to 
be bound by Article 16 (4). 
In the Third Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, Saudi Arabia affirmed its position 
that there is a right of innocent passage 
through straits that connect parts of the 
high seas only. In espousing that end, it 
joined Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates in proposing a 
definition of "straits used for interna-
tional navigation" whereby the high seas 
connection and customary usage of the 
straits for international navigation be-
come central. In 1974, Kuwait, speaking 
on behalf of Saudi Arabia and others, 
complained that the Convention article 
on straits had been politically in-
spired.48 It is in light of this complaint 
and in view of Saudi Arabia's strong 
antagonism towards the state of Israel 
that one should question the earlier 
assertion that the Kingdom was acting 
only on behalf of general principle and 
not "regional policies or transient situa-
tions,,49 when opposing Article 16 (4). 
Closely connected to this position is 
the Saudi concern over automatic 
passage for warships through the world's 
straits. In the 1958 Conference, Saudi 
Arabia opposed the British proposal 
which would allow unhindered access 
for warships on the ground that there 
are different types of straits. The "terri-
torial straits" are inseparable from terri-
torial waters, the Kingdom's delegate 
argued, and consequently the coastal 
state possesses the authority to regulate 
passage of warships for its own security. 
Al-Shuqayn invoked such authorities as 
Oppenheim and Colombos to buttress 
the identification of straits and terri-
torial waters, but Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
of the United Kingdom, himself a noted 
legal authority, found the references 
irrelevant since the question of terri-
toriality is conceded by the very nature 
of innocent passage. Undaunted, 
al-Shuqayn turned to another great legal 
authority and judge of the International 
Court of Justice, Philip Jessup, for 
support of the contention that warships 
can no more sail through a state's 
territorial waters without permission 
than can a foreign army march across its 
soil.s 0 
When a draft provision requiring 
prior authorization for the passage of 
warships through the territorial sea as a 
whole was deleted, Saudi Arabia voted 
against the entire article along with 23 
other states, thereby depriving the 
article of the needed two-thirds ma-
jority for adoption. Al-Shuqayn said in 
explanation that responsible sovereignty 
demands prior authorization before a 
warship can pass through territorial 
waters, since warships may not be re-
garded as inherently peaceful; un-
authorized passage, therefore, is a viola-
tion of sovereignty and equivalent to 
aggression.S1 This emphasis on sover-
eign control contrasts somewhat with 
that of the 1933 Coast Guard regula-
tions which prohibit the levying of taxes 
and the boarding by marine patrols of 
foreign warships in its jurisdiction. The 
only specific article on warships 
adopted by the 1958 Geneva Confer-
ence, Article 23, is acceptable to Saudi 
Arabia since it emphasizes that they are 
subject to the coastal state's rules of 
passage through its waters. The Conven-
tion, nevertheless, is objectionable be-
cause the gist of draft Article 24 (1) 
allowing unauthorized warship passage 
through straits is embodied in Article 16 
which applies to "all ships" and which 
absolutizes the right of unimpeded in-
nocent passage through straits. As late 
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as 1974, the Democratic Republic of 
Yemen voiced similar opposition to 
treating warships and merchant vessels 
in the same manner, especially when 
passage through straits is concerned.S 2 
This stance, it should be noted, is not 
limited to Arab states or to Middle 
Eastern straits; Canada recently has en-
dorsed the principle of prior authoriza-
tion, and Indonesia and Malaysia 
actually require such notification and 
authorization before transit is allowed 
through straits they control.S3 The 
United States, however, does not 
officially recognize the necessity of such 
notification. 
Fishing. Saudi Arabia is less con-
cerned with fishing than with other 
maritime issues, but it has objected to 
the Convention of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas which does not con-
sider fishing rights in the territorial sea. 
The country strongly argued in the 
1960 Geneva Conference that the 
coastal state possesses sovereignty over 
the fish in its waters and so must grant 
authorization before foreign fishermen 
can operate within its limits. The Saudi 
delegate criticized particulary the Brit-
ish and French for claiming that such a 
rule would create an economic hardship 
for the maritime states that depend on 
farflung fishing catches. His response 
was a general accusation of neo-
imperialism, but it reflected Saudi sensi-
tivity to fishing by outsiders in the 
abundant waters of the Red Sea and 
Persian Gulf: "You catch my fish from 
coasts, you transport it in your fleets, 
you can it in your factories, you carry it 
again in your fleets to be exported to 
my country, and the only thing I have 
to do is to pay the bill-and how heavy 
the bill is. ,,5 4 
The representative's solution, how-
ever, was conciliatory because he sug-
gested a sharing within or outside the 
U.N. framework of the advanced tech-
nology of the great maritime states and 
the fishing catch of the coastal states. 
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Although Saudi Arabia has not asserted 
its right to control fishing in a wider 
area, it should be noted that when it 
claimed a contiguous zone in the Persian 
Gulf, it specifically stated that the 
existence of the zone is not to be 
construed as affecting Saudi fishing 
rights. The disclaimer, intended to avoid 
the conclusion that such rights are 
limited to the zone, is compatible in 
theory with one of the main com-
ponents of the economic zone concept. 
Given the strident voices that are often 
heard in advancing the new economic 
zone, the Saudi offer of cooperation 
with regard to fishing exploitation is at 
least refreshing. 
Conclusions. Although it is difficult 
to make concrete conclusions, some 
general points can be stressed. 
(1) Saudi Arabia accepts several 
principles that are part of the devel-
oping regime of the sea, even though it 
has not become a party to any of the 
legal conventions. There are several 
reasons why it has not signed the 
Geneva conventions. First, Saudi Arabia 
holds that maritime law is not part of 
international law until it is whole. The 
law of the sea is not likely to be 
complete until it incorporates a defini-
tion of the breadth of the territorial sea, 
a division of rules on innocent passage 
according to states of war and peace, 
and a clear statement of control over 
the fish of the territorial sea. Secondly, 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
incorporates the objectionable rule that 
all straits are open without limit to the 
passage of all ships, thus precariously 
ignoring the specific character of the 
straits, the types of the ships involved, 
and the disposition and intent of the 
state whose vessel is transiting. Finally, 
as one Saudi lawyer pointed out, the 
reluctance to sign may be a function of 
the traditional Saudi caution induced by 
historical isolationism.5 5 
Despite Saudi Arabia's nonadherence 
to the conventions, it has accepted 
several principles that are part of the 
emerging international consensus: sover-
eignty over a 12-mile territorial sea, 
control of certain activities in the con-
tiguous zone, sovereignty over the ad-
jacent submarine area or continental 
shelf and its natural resources, reliance 
on the median.line and equidistance to 
delineate offshore boundaries, the open-
ness of the high seas beyond the terri-
torial sea and continental shelf and the 
basic right of innocent passage. In the 
most recent negotiations in the Third 
Law of the Sea Conference, it has also 
indicated its support of the economic 
zone concept and of the idea that ocean 
bed resources are the "common heritage 
of mankind," both of which are now 
part of the new growing consensus. 
There has not yet been a clear Saudi 
position on the character of the 
proposed international seabed authority 
other than the bland statement that it 
should respect the rights of all states 
and be fair in distribution.5 6 The gen-
eral point is clear, however, that Saudi 
Arabia in practice accepts many of the 
maritime standards which are found in 
legal texts it chooses not to endorse. 
(2) The Saudi position is not seri-
ously at odds with the Western position 
generally and the American position 
particularly. Part of the reason for the 
coincidence of views is the fact that in 
the absence of Islamic guidance, Saudi 
Arabia has relied heavily on pre-
dominantly occidental treaties, diplo-
matic notes, court cases, and scholars to 
elucidate the legal norms. While it is 
true that the Saudis may have differed 
with the United States and Great Britain 
frequently in the past, it is also true that 
by the time of the present negotiations, 
they were largely in accord with those 
states and differing with many of the 
developing ones. It is interesting to note 
that in the one area, passage through 
straits, where Saudi Arabia and the West 
disagree strongly, the Kingdom's posi-
tion may partly be influenced by its 
adamant belief that Israel's most 
grievous sin has been to occupy the holy 
city of Jerusalem. In general, however, 
we may conclude that culture has not 
affected Saudi Arabia's maritime policy 
and that it has acted, like any modern 
state, to advance its national interests 
and to legitimize them by invocation of 
the standard sources of modern interna· 
tionallaw. 
(3) Saudi Arabia's behavior is bifur-
cated. On its western shores, it has acted 
to support the claim that Israel has no 
legitimate right of transit to Eilat. This 
stance is mitigated by the fact that the 
navigable channel through the Straits of 
Tiran lies in Egyptian, not Saudi, 
waters, but Saudi Arabia's growing 
might, its clear antipathy for Israel, and 
its strong support of Egypt suggest that 
the legal position cannot be discounted 
as contributing to the general tension. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has 
indicated a willingness to cooperate and 
negotiate in matters concerning the Per-
sian Gulf. Evidence can be found in the 
agreements with Bahrain, Iran, and 
Kuwait. The Kingdom, moreover, has 
committed itself in principle to the 
equitable distribution and exploitation 
of sea resources off both shores. The 
attitude of compromise at sea is heart-
ening at a time when resources on land 
are being depleted rapidly. 
Saudi Arabia may not be in the 
leadership of the developing states nor is 
it a substantial naval power, but it is a 
state with significant resources at its 
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disposal. Its wealth is the main under-
pinning of its foreign policy which has 
generally sought to preserve the status 
quo rather than to foster systemic trans-
formations.57 Caution and pragmatism, 
indeed, mark the Saudi approach to 
international politics and international 
law. Political caution has recently been 
confirmed by its firm opposition to the 
Soviet naval base in Somalia58 and 
pragmatism by its continuing efforts to 
avoid direct military struggle with Israel. 
Legal caution is evidenced by its hesita-
tion in becoming a party to specific 
multilateral covenants and pragmatism 
by its factual compliance with the law 
nonetheless. Since the "wide common" 
of Mahan59 is troubled in these days of 
exorbitant national claims and naval 
rivalries, it is important to note that 
neither Saudi Arabia's aloofness from 
the conventions nor its generally strong 
commitment to Islam has made it un-
sympathetic to the West. But Saudi 
Arabia's maritime policy is really two 
tales of the sea. In one case the antagon-
ism towards Israel has determined the 
Saudi resolve to oppose part of the law, 
but in several other cases the perception 
of state interests has led both to the 
moderate assertion of control over 
nearby maritime zones and to the will-
ingness to negotiate conflicting claims in 
accordance with the broad legal frame-
work most states accept:- The Saudi 
example in the Persian Gulf at least is 
reassuring, and it is hoped that this 
example will be influential. 
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